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Wheelchair Ramps in Cyberspace: Bringing the 
Americans with Disabilities Act into the 21st 
Century 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act1 
to protect disabled individuals from discrimination in a variety of 
forms. The Act was designed to provide disabled individuals the 
same opportunities that individuals without disabilities enjoy. 
Modifications designed to fulfill the Act’s goal of equal access, such 
as wheelchair ramps, have become common since the Act was signed 
into law; however, many disabled individuals do not have equal 
access to the World Wide Web. 
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that “No 
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in 
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 
operates a place of public accommodation.”2 Some circuit courts 
interpret “place of public accommodation” broadly to include 
nonphysical places, while other circuit courts interpret this provision 
narrowly to require a physical tangible facility—putting virtual places 
like websites outside of Title III coverage.  
This unresolved circuit split culminated in the summer of 2012 
when two nearly identical cases regarding website accessibility were 
decided by two different district courts with completely different 
outcomes. The issue in both cases was whether the lack of video 
subtitles in Netflix’s online streaming library was a violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court located in the 
Ninth Circuit held that the Americans with Disabilities Act did not 
apply to Netflix’s website because the website was not a place of 
public accommodation,3 while the district court located in the First 
Circuit held that Netflix’s website was a place of public 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added). 
 3. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
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accommodation and therefore subject to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.4 The decision of the latter court marks the first time 
that a federal court has held that a website is a place of public 
accommodation within the meaning of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. With this precedent set, website accessibility for 
disabled individuals is likely to become a hot topic as any private 
website that is not designed to be accessible may now successfully be 
sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
This Comment offers a solution to the Americans with 
Disabilities Act’s website accessibility problem and the unresolved 
circuit split. This solution, called “the storefront test,” extends Title 
III of the Americans with Disabilities Act to a wide variety of 
websites without overstepping the textual bounds of the statute. The 
storefront test does not purport to be a substitution for legislation, 
but it provides a workable judicial solution that builds upon previous 
circuit court decisions without stepping into the realm of judicial 
lawmaking. The storefront test proposes the following: 
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a 
substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical facility 
may be subject to Title III if the facility and the website together 
form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the 
enumerated
5
 places of public accommodation. 
While this test is simple and intuitive enough for easy application 
(as well as catchy enough to be remembered), it has enough depth 
and utility to be useful in a variety of complex scenarios. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and enactment of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as subsequent legislative 
and regulatory developments, and gives an overview of the Internet 
and the accessibility challenges the Internet poses for some disabled 
individuals. Part III of this Comment analyzes the circuit split on the 
issue of whether Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
applies to nonphysical places such as websites, discusses the recent 
Netflix decisions, and suggests the split is reconcilable at the circuit 
level. Part IV proposes the storefront test as a solution to the circuit 
split. Part IV explores the statutory boundaries of the Americans 
 
 4. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 5. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act defines “place of public 
accommodation” through twelve broad, but exhaustive, categories enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 
12181(7). These categories are discussed in Part II.B. 
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with Disabilities Act to ensure that the storefront test provides 
maximum protection without exceeding the bounds of the Act. The 
storefront test is then analyzed in greater detail and applied in 
several different circumstances to demonstrate its practicality and 
versatility. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE 
INTERNET 
This section discusses the enactment and purpose of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA” or “the Act”) and the title 
of the ADA relevant to this discussion—Title III. This section then 
gives a brief overview of the history and growth of the Internet, 
along with the ways disabled individuals experience website 
discrimination. Finally, this section discusses website accessibility-
related regulations and amendments that were passed subsequent to 
the enactment of the ADA. 
A. Enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
On July 26, 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act was signed 
into law6 with overwhelming bipartisan support.7 The ADA 
originated with the National Council on Disability,8 and was largely 
modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973.9 The purpose of the Act, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(b), is: 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (3) 
to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in 
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of 
 
 6. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1165 (July 26, 1990). 
 7. The ADA passed with a vote of 91–6 in the Senate and 377–28 in the House. 136 
CONG. REC. 17,376 (1990) (Senate); 136 CONG. REC. 17,296–97 (1990) (House). 
 8. 135 CONG. REC. S10,790 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 9. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in 
Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,545 (July 26, 1991); see also Robert L. Burgdorf, 
Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 241, 250–51, 
285 (2008) (noting that the civil rights movement in the 1960s served as a model for Americans 
with disabilities and that language in the ADA was borrowed from the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
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individuals with disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of 
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the 
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by 
people with disabilities. 
The ADA was intended to be a comprehensive piece of civil 
rights legislation10 that would fully integrate Americans with 
disabilities into society.11 In enacting the ADA, Congress found that 
about forty-three million Americans “have one or more physical or 
mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population 
as a whole is growing older.”12 Congress also found that “unlike 
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who 
have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often 
had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.”13 
The ADA has impacted the lives of individuals both with and 
without disabilities throughout the nation. According to the 
National Council on Disability, the ADA has “begun to transform 
the social fabric of our nation,” by changing the way Americans 
perceive disabilities and by putting discrimination against disabled 
individuals on par with race or gender discrimination.14 America 
continues to accommodate physically impaired individuals with 
accessible streets, buildings, sports arenas, and transportation 
systems.15 The ADA has also helped give disabled individuals equal 
opportunity in the workplace.16 Although the ADA provides broad 
protection for disabled individuals, there are no express regulations 
for website accessibility within the ADA. 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 17,031 (1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (describing the 
ADA as a comprehensive and elaborate piece of civil rights legislation). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006); see also Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 9, at 249 (noting that 
the ultimate objective of civil rights activists—full integration and participation—was endorsed 
in the ADA). 
 12. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(1). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4). 
 14. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1 (2000). 
 15. Senator Tom Harkin, 20 Years of Progress Thanks to the ADA, ABILITY MAG. (June/July 
2010), available at http://www.abilitymagazine.com/20th-ADA.html. 
 16. Id. 
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Complaints that a private party’s17 website violates the ADA are 
brought under Title III of the ADA.18 Title III prohibits 
discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any 
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.”19 The ADA differs from other civil rights 
legislation—where a place of public accommodation is typically only 
prohibited from denying access to its goods or services on the basis of 
some characteristic—by requiring places of public accommodation to 
affirmatively ensure that individuals with disabilities have equal access 
to the goods or services.20 Thus, a place of public accommodation 
discriminates against a disabled individual by failing to take 
affirmative action to accommodate the individual, such as building a 
wheelchair ramp. The ADA provides exceptions if the owner or 
operator can show that removing a barrier would not be readily 
achievable or that making modifications would fundamentally alter 
the nature of the goods or services or result in undue burden.21 
Section 12181 of the Act defines a “place of public 
accommodation” as a place which affects commerce and falls within 
one of twelve enumerated categories.22 Congress stated its intent 
 
 17. Websites operated by public entities are not relevant to this discussion because they 
are regulated by the Rehabilitation Act, which sets out specific accessibility guidelines for 
websites operated by public entities. 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2006); 36 C.F.R. § 1194.22. 
 18. See infra discussion Part III. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added). 
 20. See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 104 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 389 (“These general prohibitions are patterned after the basic, general 
prohibitions that exist in other civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination . . . . In order not 
to discriminate against people with disabilities, however, certain steps must often be taken as 
well in order to ensure that an opportunity for individuals with disabilities to participate in the 
goods or services is effective and meaningful.”). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv). 
 22.  
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located 
within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is 
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such 
proprietor; 
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of 
exhibition or entertainment; 
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering; 
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other 
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that these twelve categories be exhaustive, but that the examples 
within the categories be illustrative and the catchall phrases at the 
end of the examples be construed liberally.23 
Congress gave authority to the Attorney General to issue 
regulations and carry out Title III as it applies to facilities and 
vehicles.24 Accordingly, the Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “the 
Department”) further defined public accommodations as “facilities,” 
and stated that a facility includes all portions of a building, 
walkways, parking lots, and equipment.25 
To bring a suit under Title III of the ADA, individuals must first 
establish that they have a disability26 and are subject to current 
discrimination.27 Next, the individual must show that the accused 
party is a private entity and that the public accommodation affects 
 
sales or rental establishment; 
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe 
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, 
insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service 
establishment; 
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation; 
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection; 
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, 
or other place of education; 
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption 
agency, or other social service center establishment; and 
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or 
recreation. 
Id. § 12181(7). 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 100 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 383 
(“For example, the legislation lists ‘golf course’ as an example under the category of ‘place of 
exercise or recreation.’ This does not mean that only driving ranges constitute ‘other similar 
establishments.’ Tennis courts, basketball courts, dance halls, playgrounds, and aerobics 
facilities . . . are also included in this category.”); see also S. REP. NO. 101-16, at 59 (1989). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). 
 25. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. 
 26. Disability is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 as a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; a record of such an 
impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment, meaning that an individual was 
subjected to discrimination based on a perceived disability, whether or not the impairment 
limits a major life activity; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)–(i). 
 27. Schroedel v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 885 F. Supp. 594, 598–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(“In order to establish an injury in fact necessary to a claim for injunctive relief, the moving 
party must demonstrate that a defendant’s conduct is causing irreparable harm. This 
requirement cannot be met absent a showing of a real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will 
be wronged again.”). 
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commerce.28 The plaintiff then has the burden of establishing a 
prima facie case of a violation under Title III.29 To do so, the plaintiff 
must show that the other party owns, leases, or operates a place of 
public accommodation30 that fits under one of the twelve 
enumerated categories listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), and that the 
plaintiff was denied “the full and equal enjoyment” of the goods or 
services on the basis of a disability.31 Note that Title III only requires 
private entities to provide equal access to the goods or services, not to 
provide content that is equally enjoyable—for example, a bookstore 
may be required to construct a wheelchair ramp providing access to 
the books, but it is not required to alter its inventory to stock Braille 
books.32 Next, the plaintiff must show that the proposed 
accommodations are reasonable; namely, that they are “readily 
achievable,” will not result in “undue burden,” or will not 
“fundamentally alter the nature” of the services or goods.33 The 
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove otherwise, and then 
back to the plaintiff to rebut the defendant.34 Plaintiffs bringing suit 
under Title III can only request injunctive relief. But if the Attorney 
General becomes involved in the suit, the court may award damages 
at the Attorney General’s request.35 
Although there are several possible reasons for the original 
ADA’s lack of regulations regarding website accessibility,36 the most 
definite reason is that the Internet did not exist as we know it when 
the ADA was enacted.37 While the original ADA’s lack of regulations 
 
 28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a); see also id. §§ 12101(b)(4), 12181(1)–(2), (6). Note 
that public entities are covered under Title II of the ADA. Id. § 12132. 
 29. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. E*Trade Access, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59–60 (D. Mass. 
2006); Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1166–67 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); see also Mayberry, 843 F. Supp. at 1166. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
 32. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(i)–(iv); see also Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 
F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 34. See 136 A.L.R. Fed. 1 § 2(b); see also E*Trade, 464 F. Supp. 2d. at 61; Mayberry, 843 F. 
Supp. at 1166–67. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2). 
 36. See infra discussion Part IV.A. 
 37. In the late 1960s, computers in different locations were connected together to 
exchange data for the first time, CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A 
CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT 1, 61 (1999), however, “Internet” did not become the 
official word to describe the networks that had developed until 1983, id. at 110, when fewer than 
1000 computers were connected to the Internet. Robert Hobbes Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline, 
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regarding website accessibility is understandable, the lack of 
subsequent legislation or regulations regarding private website 
accessibility for the disabled is less understandable. The DOJ has 
issued numerous regulations for Title III of the ADA38 pursuant to 
its grant of authority from Congress,39 but regulations concerning 
private website accessibility have yet to be issued.40 Congress has 
 
ZAKON.ORG, http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline (last updated Dec. 30, 2011) (it is 
not until 1984 that the number of hosts breaks 1000). In 1991, the World Wide Web was 
invented, along with the first web server, browser, and website. JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT 
CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN: THE STORY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB 180–203 (2000). 
Thus, when the ADA was enacted in 1990, there was no such thing as a website. 
 38. 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.104–36.608. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). 
 40. In 2010, on the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the ADA, the DOJ issued an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding ADA regulation of web accessibility, 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of 
State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460 
(proposed July 26, 2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOJ-
CRT-2010-0005-0001, and President Barack Obama announced that “[e]ven as we speak, 
Attorney General Eric Holder is preparing new rules to ensure accessibility of websites.” Remarks 
by the President on 20th Anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act, WHITE HOUSE (July 26, 
2010, 6:26 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-20th-
anniversary-americans-with-disabilities-act. However, in July 2011 the DOJ announced that this 
would be a “long-term item” to the disappointment of disability advocates, meaning that it will 
be several years before the DOJ promulgates any actual regulation on this issue, if at all. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DOJ SEMIANNUAL REGULATORY AGENDA - FALL 2011, at 86 (Jan. 2012), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DOJ-OAG-2012-0001-0001; DOJ 
Delays Web Accessibility Regulations, LAW OFFICE OF LAINEY FEINGOLD (July 19, 2011), 
http://lflegal.com/2011/07/web-delay/. In 2013, the DOJ website stated that it will issue a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the issue of Title II website accessibility in July 2013 and 
Title III in December 2013. See OFF. INFO. REG. AFF., 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=1190-AA61 (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2013); OFF. INFO. REG. AFF., 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=1190-AA65 (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2013). But as of the publication of this Comment, the DOJ has failed to issue a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Title II.  
Despite the DOJ’s lack of regulations, the Department has issued several statements 
regarding its positions on the issue. As early as 1996, Deval Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, 
stated in a letter to Senator Harkin—chief sponsor of the ADA in the Senate—the DOJ’s position 
that Title III of the ADA applies to websites. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Civil Rights Div., to Senator Tom Harkin, U.S. Senate (Sept. 9, 1996), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/cltr204.txt. The DOJ has also stated that Title III of the ADA 
applies to private websites in several amicus briefs. See, e.g., Brief for the U.S. Department of 
Justice, filed as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Hooks v. OKbridge, 232 F.3d 208 (2000) 
(No. 99-50891), 1999 WL 33806215, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/hooks.pdf; Brief for the U.S. Department of 
Justice, filed as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 
F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-111197), 2001 WL 34094038, at *5, available at 
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also failed to take legislative action on this issue. In 2000, before any 
court had issued a ruling on whether a website is a place of public 
accommodation, the House’s Subcommittee on the Constitution 
held a hearing regarding the applicability of the ADA to the 
Internet.41 After the hearings, the committee filed a brief House 
report merely stating the issues that had been discussed and 
recognizing the DOJ’s position on the issue, without expressing an 
opinion on the matter.42 In 2008 Congress amended the ADA as a 
result of Supreme Court decisions that had limited the Act’s 
breadth.43 Despite Congress’s awareness of the website accessibility 
issue—and the development of a circuit split on the issue44—the 
amendments did not mention website accessibility. 
B. Internet Accessibility for Americans with Disabilities 
Americans with visual impairments—who, according to 2010 
census data, number over eight million, two million of which are 
blind45—face the biggest obstacles with regards to website 
accessibility and navigation.46 Individuals with mobility 
impairments, deafness, and epilepsy may also experience problems 
accessing and navigating websites.47 
 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/rendon.pdf. The DOJ has also negotiated 
settlements where they required accessibility in nonphysical locations, see, e.g., Enforcing the 
ADA: A Status Report from the Department of Justice: April-June 2002, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.ada.gov/aprjun02.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2012), and even brought a suit on its 
own for a Title III violation involving website inaccessibility. See Enforcing the ADA: A Status 
Report from the Department of Justice, Dec. 2010, at 4, available at 
http://www.ada.gov/octdec10.pdf. 
 41. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 65-010 at 19 (2000) (statement of Gary Wunder, Programmer Analyst-Expert, ITS-
Hosp. Bus. Apps., Univ. of Mo.), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65010.000/hju65010_0f.htm. 
 42. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-1048, at 275 (2001). 
 43. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §2, reprinted in 2008 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553. 
 44. See infra discussion Part III. 
 45. This number only includes the civilian noninstitutionalized population of America 
ages fifteen and older. Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
July 2012, at 4, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf. 
 46. Kel Smith, The Missing Link: Understanding Web Accessibility, PRAC. LAW., June 2007, at 
31, 32, available at http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PL_TPL0706-
Smith_thumb.pdf (“[T]he term ‘web accessibility’ pertains mainly to the blind.”). 
 47. See id.; Nina Golden, Access This: Why Institutions of Higher Education Must Provide Access 
to the Internet to Students with Disabilities, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 363, 391–92 (2008). 
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As websites have become more interactive and richer in 
multimedia content, it has become more challenging for some 
individuals with disabilities to access the opportunities associated 
with this content.48 To access the Internet, some individuals with 
disabilities use assistive hardware and software such as screen 
readers.49 Screen readers convert text into speech so that blind 
individuals can listen to web content.50 Screen readers cannot 
discern what an image is depicting, but the web designer can add a 
brief description of the image to the underlying code so that the 
screen reader can describe the image to the user.51 To navigate the 
website and “click” on links, a blind person may use a keyboard.52 In 
the early days of the Internet, when websites were primarily text 
based, blind individuals were able to access and navigate websites 
with relative ease.53 However, as websites grew more sophisticated 
and interactive, developers started putting code in places where the 
graphic description would normally go, causing the screen reader to 
read off an indecipherable list of random words and numbers that 
have nothing to do with the image.54 Bruce Sexton Jr., a plaintiff in 
National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.,55 explained that when 
he attempted to navigate Target’s website he could not “tell whether 
the numbers he hears on other parts of the home page correspond to 
products, files or something else.”56 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Smith, supra note 46, at 32–33. 
 50. Visual Disabilities, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/visual/blind (last visited Dec. 
19, 2012); see e.g., JAWS for Windows Screen Reading Software, FREEDOM SCI., 
http://www.freedomscientific.com/products/fs/JAWS-product-page.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 
2012). 
 51. Visual Disabilities, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/visual/blind (last visited Dec. 
19, 2012); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
106th Cong. 65-010 at 19 (2000) (statement of Gary Wunder, Programmer Analyst-Expert, ITS-
Hosp. Bus. Apps., Univ. of Mo.), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65010.000/hju65010_0f.htm [hereinafter 
Hearings]. 
 52. Visual Disabilities, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/visual/blind (last visited Dec. 
19, 2012). 
 53. Diane Murley, Web Site Accessibility, 100 LAW LIBR. J. 401, 404 (2008). 
 54. Id.; Smith, supra note 46. 
 55. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
 56. Carol Silwa, Accessibility Issue Comes to a Head, COMPUTERWORLD (May 8, 2006, 
12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/111219/ 
Accessibility_Issue_Comes_to_a_Head. 
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Because the text of Title III and its accompanying regulations 
appear to limit places of public accommodation to physical places,  
plaintiffs have had difficulty bringing claims under Title III against 
websites that are not accessible to individuals with disabilities.57 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: IS A WEBSITE A PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION 
UNDER TITLE III OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT? 
The idea that networks like the Internet are a “place” was played 
around with as early as 1982, where the term “cyberspace” was first 
used in a fictional story to describe objects and events taking place 
inside a computer network.58 One author describes cyberspace as 
the ‘place’ where a telephone conversation appears to occur. Not 
inside your actual phone, the plastic device on your desk. Not 
inside the other person’s phone, in some other city. THE PLACE 
BETWEEN the phones . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [A]nd though there is still no substance to cyberspace, nothing you can 
handle, it has a strange kind of physicality now. It makes good sense 
today to talk of cyberspace as a place all its own.59 
The cases discussed in this section involve the question of 
whether a website—or other nonphysical place—is a place of public 
accommodation. Over the last several years, a split has developed in 
the circuits on this question, with some circuits interpreting “place 
of public accommodation” broadly to include nonphysical places, 
while others require a nexus between a nonphysical entity (such as a 
website) and an actual physical place. This section first analyzes the 
cases and positions of the circuits involved in the split and then 
discusses how the circuits’ positions may be reconciled. 
 
 57. See infra discussion Part III; see, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 
F.3d 1104, 1114 (2000) (“All the items on this list, however, have something in common. They 
are actual, physical places. . . .”). 
 58. BRUCE STERLING, Introduction to THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/101; Scott Thill, March 17, 
1948: William Gibson, Father of Cyberspace, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2009/03/dayintech_0317 
 59. STERLING, Introduction to THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, supra note 58. 
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A. The Broad View: Title III Is Not Limited to Actual Physical Places 
The First, Second, and Seventh Circuits are often cited for taking 
the position that a place of public accommodation, as defined under 
Title III of the ADA, does not have to be a physical structure.60 
However, these circuit courts have not explicitly held that a website is 
a place of public accommodation as this issue has not been brought 
before them yet. 
1. Places of public accommodation are not limited to physical structures 
The issue of whether places of public accommodation must be 
actual physical structures was brought to a circuit court for the first 
time in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Ass’n of 
New England, Inc.61 Carparts involved an employee who was enrolled 
in an employer-funded medical reimbursement plan. After the 
employee was diagnosed with HIV, the health plan was amended to 
limit benefits for AIDS-related illnesses to $25,000.62 After being 
diagnosed with AIDS, the employee63 brought suit alleging, among 
other things, illegal discrimination on the basis of a disability under 
Title III of the ADA. 
The district court in Carparts dismissed the claim, concluding 
that the defendants—the Automotive Wholesalers Association of 
New England (who offered the plan) and the plan’s administrating 
trust64—were not liable under Title III because they were not places 
of public accommodation.65 The district court interpreted “places of 
public accommodation” as “actual physical structures with definite 
physical boundaries which a person physically enters for the purpose 
of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services therein” and concluded 
that neither the association nor the administrating trust had these 
characteristics.66 
 
 
 60. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 61. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 62. AIDS is a disability under the ADA. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 63. Although the employee died before this suit was resolved, the executors of his estate 
were substituted as plaintiffs in this action. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 14 n.1. 
 64. Id. at 14. 
 65. Id. at 15. 
 66. Id. at 18. 
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On appeal, the First Circuit rejected the district court’s 
interpretation of Title III and held that the plain meaning of the 
statute does not limit public places to physical structures. The court 
reasoned that the statute’s inclusion of “travel service[s]” and “other 
service establishment[s]”67 supports the position that Title III does 
not require a place of public accommodation to be an actual physical 
structure. The court explained that many customers never enter an 
office of a travel service because business is often conducted by 
telephone or correspondence: “It would be irrational to conclude that 
persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the 
ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the 
telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such 
an absurd result.”68 After holding that a place of public 
accommodation is not limited to physical places, the court clarified 
that Title III does not regulate the content of the goods or services, 
only access to the goods or services. 
While Carparts is an oft-cited landmark decision for individuals 
seeking to extend Title III protection to cyberspace, it is important to 
note that the First Circuit did not hold that the association or its 
administrating trust were places of public accommodation but 
remanded the case to the district court to make a determination 
consistent with the Circuit Court’s interpretation of the statute.69 
In 1999, the Seventh Circuit decided Doe v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., another case alleging Title III discrimination by a health 
insurance policy that capped benefits for AIDS-related illnesses.70 
Chief Judge Richard Posner wrote the opinion in this case, and 
started off by stating: 
The core meaning of [place of public accommodation], plainly 
enough, is that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, 
dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility 
(whether in physical space or in electronic space) . . . cannot exclude  
 
 
 
 67. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006). 
 68. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. But see Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, where Justice 
Kennedy states that the use of “absurdity” to justify a result should be limited to situations 
which are truly absurd, not just situations where an odd result may occur. 491 U.S. 440, 471–82 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 69. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20. 
 70. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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disabled persons from entering . . . and . . . using the facility in 
the same way that the nondisabled do.71 
The court stated that an insurance company and its policies are 
“plainly” within the scope of Title III and neither the company nor 
its policies can refuse to sell insurance to a person with AIDS. The 
court also stated that if a company has a policy setting a cap on 
AIDS-related illnesses that effectively excludes individuals with AIDS 
from receiving the benefits of the plan, even without express 
restrictions, that would still be an exclusion on the basis of a 
disability under Title III of the ADA. The court found, however, that 
the policy capping benefits for AIDS related illnesses did not have 
such effect, as individuals with AIDS also had non-AIDS-related 
medical needs and were given full and equal access to non-AIDS-
related coverage.72 
In Doe, the plaintiffs were essentially asking the court to regulate 
the content of the insurance policy and coverage rather than the 
access to the policy and coverage. The court ultimately held that the 
plaintiffs’ Title III violation claim failed, as Title III regulates access 
rather than content of services and goods.73 
Lastly, in 1999 the Second Circuit decided an insurance coverage 
case: Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co.74 The Second Circuit stated 
that Title III guaranteed “more than mere physical access”75 and that 
it is not sufficient that an entity covered by Title III provide access to 
its facilities if the entity still refuses to sell merchandise to an 
individual on the basis of a disability. The court reasoned that the 
statute’s use of the word “of” in “goods [and] services . . . of any 
place of public accommodation,”76 means that access is not limited 
to goods and services “inside” a place of public accommodation.77 
Instead, the court reasoned, access extends to any goods and services 
 
 71. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). The court cited Carparts to support this proposition. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 554–55. Doe was appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court denied 
certiorari. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 528 U.S. 1106 (2000). Unfortunately this does not 
provide useful fodder for speculating about whether the Supreme Court approves of a broader 
interpretation of Title III as Doe’s holding was limited to finding that Title III does not regulate 
content of goods or services. 
 74. 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 77. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 33. 
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that the entity offers, irrespective of how they offer it.78 The court 
held that the company’s insurance policy itself may be a covered 
entity under Title III and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.79 
2. A website is a place of public accommodation 
On June 19, 2012, in National Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc. 
(“Netflix II”), a district court in the First Circuit became the first 
federal court to hold that a website, as a standalone entity—meaning 
that the website itself was the only subject of the decision and no 
physical selling locations, warehouses, or tangible goods were 
implicated80—was a place of public accommodation.81 The suit, 
brought by deaf individuals and advocates under Title III of the ADA, 
alleged that Netflix did not provide equal access to its services.82 
Netflix is a video rental service that offers titles to subscribers 
through its “Watch Instantly” service, where a subscriber selects 
what title they would like to watch and the title is instantly streamed 
from Netflix’s servers to the subscriber’s computer or device.83 The 
plaintiffs in Netflix II alleged that Netflix denied deaf subscribers 
equal enjoyment and access to the streaming service by only offering 
closed captioning on a small number of titles, effectively excluding 
deaf individuals from access to the non-captioned titles. Netflix filed 
a motion to dismiss on the basis that, among other things, its 
website was not a place of public accommodation under Title III.84 
The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts denied Netflix’s motion, holding that Netflix’s 
website was a place of public accommodation.85 The court did not 
establish a “nexus” between the website and an actual “brick-and-
mortar store” like other district courts have done in similar cases—
as discussed in Part III.B—but instead found that the website was 
“analogous” to a brick-and-mortar store, such as a video rental store. 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 37. 
 80. See infra note 95. 
 81. 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 82. Id. at 200–02. 
 83. See Matt Julington, Netflix Questions, SALON.COM, http://techtips.salon.com/netflix-
questions-460.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
 84. Netflix II, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199. 
 85. Id. at 200–02, 208. 
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As the court was located in the First Circuit, the court cited to 
Carparts for the proposition that a place of public accommodation 
does not need to be an actual physical structure.86 
Netflix filed a motion asking the judge to certify an interlocutory 
appeal to the First Circuit, calling the judge’s decision “the broadest-
ever extension of the ADA’s scope, thereby opening the door to 
amorphous and seemingly limitless regulation of the Internet in a 
way Congress did not envision and no other court has accepted.”87 
Netflix’s motion was denied because the judge found that the case 
did not “present the exceptional circumstances justifying an 
interlocutory appeal.”88 After Netflix’s motion was denied, Netflix 
entered into a consent decree with the plaintiffs.89 In the agreement, 
Netflix agreed to caption most of its titles by 2014.90 
Netflix II has wide-ranging implications for this area of 
jurisprudence. First, this decision potentially opens up all 
commercial websites to suit under Title III.91 Second, serious forum 
shopping implications arise from this decision, as a nearly identical 
 
 86. Id. at 200–02 (quoting H.R. Rep. 101 485(II) at 108 (1990)). Netflix also argued that 
it did not have control over which titles it could caption because of copyright issues, and 
therefore it did not own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation under Title III. Id. at 
202–03. The court disagreed with this argument, as Netflix did in fact own and operate the 
website, but indicated that Netflix may be able to amend its argument to claim that it is not able 
to caption the titles because of copyright issues in the future. Id. at 202–03. Netflix also made 
the argument that its streaming service does not fall under Title III because its services were 
accessed in private residences, not public spaces. The court found this argument unpersuasive, 
stating that: “The ADA covers the services ‘of’ a public accommodation, not services ‘at’ or ‘in’ a 
public accommodation.” Id. at 201. The court likened Netflix’s service to a pizza delivery service 
which is ordered over the phone and enjoyed in a private home. Id. at 201–02. The court also 
disagreed with Netflix’s argument that a recent regulation by the FCC, which set forth 
captioning requirements for distributors of online video programming, preempted any Title III 
requirements and mooted the plaintiffs’ claim. Id. at 203–08. 
 87. Motion to Amend at 1, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., (2012) (No. 3:11-cv-
30168), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/DMassNtlDeafvNetflixDoc65.pdf. 
 88. Order Denying Motion to Amend, Docket No. 70, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, 
Inc., (2012) (No. 3:11CV30168). 
 89. Order Granting Motion to Approve Consent Judgment, Docket No. 87, Nat’l Ass’n of 
the Deaf. v. Netflix, Inc., (2012) (No. 3:11CV30168). 
 90. Consent Decree, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., (2012) (No. 11-30168-MAP), 
available at http://dredf.org/captioning/netflix-consent-decree-10-10-12.pdf. 
 91. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Will the Floodgates Open Up for Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) Claims Against Websites?—National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, TECH. & MARKETING 
LAW BLOG (June 26, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/06/are_the_floodga.htm; 
Julian Sanchez, The ADA and the Internet, CATO INST. (June 29, 2012, 4:43 PM), 
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/the-ada-and-the-internet/. 
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claim against Netflix was dismissed in 2012 by a district court in the 
Ninth Circuit.92 Although there is no explicit circuit court holding 
that a website is a place of public accommodation, the stage is now 
set for litigants who want to pursue Title III claims against  
commercial websites without any direct connection to an actual 
brick-and-mortar place of public accommodation. 
B. The Narrow View: There Must Be a Nexus between the Good or Service 
Offered and an Actual Physical Place 
On the other side of the split, the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have held that the plain language of Title III 
requires a place of public accommodation to be a physical 
structure.93 These circuits use the “nexus” test, which requires a 
nexus between goods and services offered through nonphysical 
means to a physical place of public accommodation.94 Several district 
courts in these circuits have held that a website as a standalone 
entity95 cannot be a place of public accommodation. But these courts 
have held that a website may be subject to the ADA if a nexus can be 
established between the website and a physical place.96 While 
plaintiffs bringing claims under Title III in these circuits have been 
successful, some commentators believe that the narrow scope of the 
“nexus” test does little to ensure that persons with disabilities will 
have equal access to websites.97 The storefront test, discussed in  
 
 
 92. Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012). This case is discussed 
in Part III.B.2. 
 93. See, e.g., Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1013–14 (6th Cir. 1997) (“We, 
therefore, disagree with the First Circuit’s decision in Carparts . . . . To interpret [Title III] as 
permitting a place of accommodation to constitute something other than a physical place is to 
ignore the text of the statute.”). 
 94. See id. at 1011. 
 95. By using the phrase “standalone entity” I mean to describe websites that are only 
websites, without any link to a physical selling location or warehouse, and without a connection 
to any physical inventory. For example, Facebook is a website that does not (generally) have any 
connection to a physical selling location, warehouse, or inventory. But Amazon.com would not 
be a “standalone entity” as it has warehouses and physical inventory. See infra text accompanying 
notes 195–96. 
 96. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 97. See, e.g., Ali Abrar & Kerry J. Dingle, From Madness to Method: The Americans with 
Disabilities Act Meets the Internet, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134 (2009) (arguing that the 
nexus test is “under-inclusive in that it fails to increase the accessibility of large-scale 
commercial websites”). 
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Part IV, expands upon the nexus test to provide broader Title III 
protection. 
1. Places of public accommodation are limited to physical structures and the 
nexus test 
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit to hold that Title III only 
applies to physical places.98 In Stoutenborough, a group of hearing-
impaired plaintiffs sued the NFL and the Cleveland Browns over a 
“blackout rule,” alleging that the rule violated Title III of the ADA 
because it denied the plaintiffs access to the football games through 
communication technology.99 The Sixth Circuit held that “the 
prohibitions of Title III are restricted to ‘places’ of public 
accommodation,”100 and that an interpretation that Title III is not 
limited to physical places “contravenes the plain language of the 
statute.”101 Under this interpretation of Title III, the court found 
that the NFL and its teams were not places of public 
accommodation. Although the NFL and its member clubs have 
headquarters in a physical place somewhere, the court held that its 
existence as a “league” is not subject to Title III as it is not itself a 
tangible physical structure.102 
A few years after Stoutenborough, the Sixth Circuit decided Parker 
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a case involving a long-term 
disability plan offered by an employer and issued by an insurance 
company.103 The plan provided benefits for individuals with physical 
disorders until they turned sixty-five but limited benefits for 
individuals with mental disorders to twenty-four months.104 The 
Sixth Circuit, deciding the case en banc, upheld the district court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants in an 
eight-to-five decision.105 The court found that the insurance plan 
 
 98. Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 99. Id. at 581–82. 
 100. Id. at 583. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 104. Id. at 1008. 
 105. See id. at 1008, 1014. It is worth noting that one of the dissenters in Parker disagreed 
with the court’s holding that Title III only applies to physical structures and pointed out that as 
business increasingly takes place over the phone or Internet, many disabled individuals will not 
have the access that Title III would guarantee if the business took place in a physical facility. Id. 
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was not a good or service of a place of public accommodation.106 The 
court noted that although an insurance office is expressly included in 
Title III’s categories,107 the plan was not offered from the insurance 
office; instead the plan was provided by a private employer and 
issued by an insurance company.108 The court reasoned that a 
member of the public could not have walked into the insurance 
company’s office or the employer’s office to receive the policy that 
plaintiff received.109 The court then introduced the “nexus” test, 
which is the requirement that there must be a nexus between a good 
or service offered through a nonphysical medium and a public 
physical facility. The court found that there was “no nexus between 
the disparity in benefits and the services which [the insurance 
company] offers to the public from its insurance office” as the public 
could not enter the office to obtain the policy that plaintiff 
received.110 
The Third Circuit became the next circuit to hold that Title III is 
limited to physical places in Ford v. Schering Plough Corp.111 Ford also 
involved a long-term disability plan,112 and the Third Circuit held 
that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title III because the 
disability plan was not offered at a physical place of public 
accommodation.113 The Third Circuit, whose analysis resembled the 
Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Parker, found that the policy was not 
offered from the insurance company’s office, but from the terms and 
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.114 The court found that, 
because the plaintiff received the benefit as a condition of her 
 
at 1020 (Boyce, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 1014. 
 107. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2006). 
 108. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010. 
 109. Id. at 1011. 
 110. Id. The court also expressly disagreed with the Carparts’s decision and the First 
Circuit’s reasoning that “[b]y including ‘travel service’ among the list of services considered 
‘public accommodations’” Title III was not limited to physical places. Id. at 1013 (quoting 
Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 
(1st Cir. 1994)). The court observed that ‘travel service’ was used in the statute alongside a shoe 
repair service, office of an accountant, an insurance office, and a professional office; and since all 
of these places are physical, applying the canon of noscitur a sociis suggests that Congress 
intended “travel office” to be a physical location. Id. at 1013–14. 
 111. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 112. Id. 603–04. 
 113. Id. at 614. 
 114. Id. at 612. 
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employment, there was not a nexus since the disability benefit plan 
was not offered from the insurance office.115 The Third Circuit 
supported its decision by comparing Title III to the Civil Rights Act, 
whose similar language has been found to only apply to physical 
places and not to organizations.116 The court also pointed out that 
confining Title III to physical places is consistent with the DOJ’s 
regulations, which focuses on goods or services that are utilized by 
access to physical places.117 
The Ninth Circuit was presented with a similar issue in Weyer v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.118 As in Parker and Ford, the 
plaintiff in Weyer brought suit alleging that an employer provided 
disability plan that provided greater physical disability benefits than 
mental disability benefits violated Title III.119 The Ninth Circuit 
stated that to successfully assert a Title III claim, there would have 
to be a nexus between the good or service and an actual physical 
place.120 The court acknowledged that an “insurance office” is a 
place of public accommodation, but stated that the case was “not 
about such matters as ramps and elevators so that disabled people 
can get to the office.”121 The court found that the plan was not 
offered by the insurance office but was offered by the employer and 
administered by the insurance company. Since there was no nexus 
between the plan and the office, no Title III violation had 
occurred.122 
 
 115. Id. at 613. Another interesting note about Ford is that Justice Alito, who now sits on 
the Supreme Court, took part in the decision. Unfortunately Justice Alito did not indicate his 
position on whether Title III applies to physical places. He did not take part in the opinion but 
wrote a separate, concurring opinion stating that he would uphold the lower court’s dismissal on 
other grounds without reaching the more difficult Title III question. See id. at 615 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“I would not reach the more difficult issue[] of . . . whether Title III’s public 
accommodation provision guarantees anything more than physical access. Th[is] issue[] ha[s] 
divided the circuits, and I would reserve judgment until we are confronted with a case in which 
the unique considerations of insurance plans are not at stake.”). 
 116. Id. at 613. 
 117. Id. The DOJ’s regulations specify that a place of public accommodation is a “facility,” 
which is further defined as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, 
equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other 
real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or 
equipment is located.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. 
 118. 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 119. Id. at 1107–08. 
 120. Id. at 1114. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1114–15. 
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In 2002 a plaintiff successfully recovered under the nexus test. In 
Rendon v. Valleycrest Productions, LTD., the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
contestant hotline was subject to Title III.123 Rendon involved an 
automated telephone contestant selection process for a game show, 
which required prospective contestants to call in and answer 
questions by selecting a number on the telephone keypad.124 
Individuals with hearing disabilities and mobility impairments were 
not able to participate in the contestant selection process because 
either they could not hear the questions over the telephone, or they 
could not move their fingers fast enough to enter their answers on 
the keypad.125 These individuals filed a complaint against the 
producers of the show alleging that the selection process violated 
Title III.126 
The Eleventh Circuit began by establishing that the game show 
itself took place in a place of public accommodation that would be 
subject to regulation under Title III. The court recognized that this 
case did not involve a physical barrier that prevented access to a place 
of public accommodation but involved an “intangible” barrier that 
prevented the plaintiffs from having the same access to the 
opportunity to be a contestant that individuals without disabilities 
had.127 The court found that the plain language of Title III covered 
both tangible and intangible barriers to places of public 
accommodation such as eligibility criteria, policies, or procedures 
that screen out individuals with disabilities.128 The court held in 
favor of the plaintiffs, reasoning that, although the automated 
telephone screening process discriminated against individuals offsite, 
it had a direct nexus to the studio.129 
 
 123. 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 124. Id. at 1280. 
 125. Id. at 1280–81. 
 126. Id. at 1281. 
 127. Id. at 1283. 
 128. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
 129. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1285 n.8. The Eleventh Circuit never explicitly stated that the 
automated telephone system itself was not a place of public accommodation, however, the 
court’s use of the nexus test to find a connection between the studio and the automated 
telephone system strongly suggests that the court would not have found the telephone system 
itself a place of public accommodation. Accordingly, most commentators place the Eleventh 
Circuit on the narrow side of the split. See, e.g., Michael P. Anderson, Ensuring Equal Access to the 
Internet for the Elderly: The Need to Amend Title III of the ADA, 19 ELDER L.J. 159, 176–78 (2011); 
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2. Websites under Title III and the nexus test 
The Eleventh Circuit became the first—and so far only—circuit 
to face the question of whether a website itself can be a place of 
public accommodation in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.130 
The court also faced the direct question of whether an individual can 
recover under Title III when they allege a nexus between a 
discriminatory website and a physical place.131 However, the 
Eleventh Circuit disposed of this case without deciding these 
issues.132 
Access Now involved a website operated by Southwest Airlines 
that offered booking specials exclusively through its website. One of 
the plaintiffs, a visually impaired individual, was unable to navigate 
Southwest’s website and brought suit alleging that Southwest.com’s 
inaccessibility violated Title III.133 At the district court level, the 
plaintiffs simply stated that Southwest.com itself was a place of 
public accommodation without alleging a nexus between the website 
and a physical facility.134 The district court dismissed the case based 
on its belief that—contrary to the plaintiffs’ assumption—
Southwest.com, as a standalone entity, was not a place of public 
accommodation and that the plaintiffs failed to establish a nexus 
between the website and a physical facility.135 
On appeal, the plaintiffs apparently ditched the argument—or 
assumption—that Southwest.com was a place of public 
accommodation and “presented [the Eleventh Circuit] with a case 
that [was] wholly different from the one they brought to the district 
 
Stephanie Khouri, Disability Law—Welcome to the New Town Square of Today’s Global Village: 
Website Accessibility for Individuals with Disabilities After Target and the 2008 Amendments to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 331, 343 (2010). 
 130. 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 131. Id. at 1329. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1325–26. The plaintiff tried to access the website and take advantage of its 
online deals through a screen reader, but the individual was not able to gain access to the deals 
offered through the website. Southwest.com did not label its graphics or make its online forms 
navigable. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1326–27. 
 135. Id. at 1328. The district court found that “the plain and unambiguous language of the 
statute and relevant regulations does not include Internet websites among the definitions of 
‘places of public accommodation,’” and that to fall within the scope of the ADA, “a public 
accommodation must be a physical, concrete structure.” Id. (quoting Access Now, Inc. v. 
Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002)). 
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court.”136 On appeal the plaintiffs argued that Southwest’s website 
had a nexus to the physical facility of Southwest Airlines.137 This 
gave the Eleventh Circuit an opportunity to avoid both issues 
because 1) the plaintiffs did not argue that the website itself was a 
place of public accommodation as they had at the district court level 
and 2) they brought a new legal theory to the appellate court that 
they did not bring before the district court. The court was reluctant 
to “wad[e] into the thicket of a circuit split on th[e] issue,”138 and 
stated that it should wait to address these important issues until 
they are properly brought before them.139 Accordingly, the court 
dismissed the appeal.140 
Access Now is important because even though the Eleventh 
Circuit did not state an opinion about whether Title III applies to 
websites, the district court’s decision that a website itself is not a 
place of public accommodation, and suggestion that a plaintiff may 
be able to allege a nexus between a website and a physical place of 
public accommodation, was not reversed. Recently, an Eleventh 
Circuit district court held that an exchange network website for 
timeshares existed only in “cyberspace” and was not a place of public 
accommodation.141 Another district court used some creativity to 
put together a string cite that attributed the following proposition to 
the Eleventh Circuit: “[T]he Eleventh Circuit has recognized 
Congress' clear intent that Title III of the ADA governs solely access 
to physical, concrete places of public accommodation.”142  It appears 
that courts within the Eleventh Circuit continue to hold that 
websites are not places of public accommodation.143 
In National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp., a district court in 
the Ninth circuit became the first federal court to apply the nexus 
 
 136. Id. at 1326. 
 137. Id. at 1328. 
 138. Id. at 1334. 
 139. Id. at 1334–35. 
 140. Id. at 1335. 
 141. Steelman v. Florida, No. 6:13–cv–123–Orl–36DAB, 2013 WL 1104746, at *3 (M.D. 
Fla. Feb. 19, 2013). 
142. Petrano v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 1:12–cv–86–SPM–GRJ, 2013 WL 
1325045, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2013). 
 143. It is interesting, though, that the court in Steelman cited to Young v. Facebook, 790 F. 
Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal 2011), a Ninth Circuit district court case, for the proposition that a 
website is not a place of public accommodation. Steelman, 2013 WL 1104746, at *3. 
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test to a website.144 In Target, the plaintiffs brought a Title III suit 
alleging that Target’s website was not accessible to individuals with 
visual impairments. The plaintiffs claimed that the website was not 
designed in a way that a screen reader could make sense of the 
graphics, making it impracticable for a blind individual to navigate 
the website.145 
Target filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
arguing that Title III only applies to physical places.146 The plaintiffs 
argued that there was a nexus between Target.com and Target 
stores.147 The court started by laying out the Ninth Circuit’s 
position in Weyer that places of public accommodation under Title III 
are limited to physical places.148 The court then recognized that 
other courts have allowed plaintiffs to allege a nexus between a good 
or service and a place of public accommodation.149 After laying this 
foundation, the court disagreed with Target’s argument that Title III 
only applies to onsite physical access, stating that Title III specifically 
requires the removal of intangible and communication barriers that 
limit access to goods and services of a place of public 
accommodation, not in a place of public accommodation.150 The 
court distinguished Target from Stoutenborough by pointing out that 
Target’s website was “heavily integrated with the brick-and-mortar 
stores and operates in many ways as a gateway to the stores.”151 
After comparing Target’s case to Rendon, the court found that, as in 
Rendon, Target’s website prevented individuals with disabilities from 
accessing the goods and services of a place of public 
accommodation.152 
Because the plaintiffs successfully asserted a nexus between 
Target.com and Target’s physical stores, the court denied Target’s 
 
 144. 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 145. Id. at 949–50; see also supra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 952. The plaintiffs argued that unequal access to the website denied them equal 
access to the goods and services offered at Target stores. This appears to be the nexus argument, 
but it is not clear if the plaintiffs actually alleged a connection between the website and a 
physical store or if the court helped out the plaintiffs by assuming the argument. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 953. 
 150. Id. at 951, 953–55. 
 151. Id. at 954–55. 
 152. Id. at 955–56. 
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motion to dismiss.153 However, the court placed a substantial 
limitation on this seemingly favorable ruling. The court granted 
Target’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title III violation claims “[t]o 
the extent that Target.com offers information and services 
unconnected to Target stores, which do not affect the enjoyment of 
goods and services offered in Target stores.”154 Thus, the court 
limited Title III’s coverage from reaching anything that was not 
directly offered inside a store, including goods or services sold 
exclusively online. The court ended up dismissing the claims of 
plaintiffs who preferred to shop online155 and even dismissed the 
original plaintiff’s claim because he only used the website to “pre-
shop” before he went to an actual Target store.156 
To successfully assert a Title III violation under Target, a plaintiff 
must first assert a nexus between the website and a physical store 
that offers the same exact goods or services to the public. Under 
Target’s nexus test, online-only retailers who do not have facilities 
open to the public, such as Amazon, are outside of the reach of the 
ADA. 
Several subsequent cases in Ninth Circuit district courts have 
dealt with the issue of whether Title III applies to websites. Young v. 
Facebook, Inc. involved a Title III claim where the plaintiff alleged that 
Facebook’s failure to provide her with customer service 
accommodations discriminated against individuals with mental 
disabilities.157 The district court conceded that Facebook’s 
headquarters were in a physical space, but found that Facebook’s 
services were only offered to the public in cyberspace and not at the 
headquarters.158 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s argument that 
Facebook.com, as a standalone entity, was a place of public 
accommodation failed and the claim was dismissed.159 In another 
Ninth Circuit district court case, Ouellette v. Viacom, a plaintiff 
 
 153. Id. at 956. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., No. C 06-01802, 2007 WL 1223755, at *4-5 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2007). 
 156. Id. at 17. 
 157. 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 158. Id. at 1115. 
 159. Id. at 1116–17, 1119. The plaintiff also claimed a nexus between Facebook.com and 
gift cards that Facebook sells in actual physical retail outlets; this argument failed because Title 
III is limited to entities that own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation, and 
Facebook did not own or operate any of these retail outlets. Id. at 1116–17. 
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brought suit alleging that the removal of his videos from the Internet 
violated Title III.160 It is not clear what the plaintiff’s disability was 
or why removal of the videos violated the ADA, but the district court 
dismissed the claim on grounds that “neither a website nor its 
servers are ‘actual, physical places where goods or services are open 
to the public,’ putting them within the ambit of the ADA.”161 
Finally, a Ninth Circuit district court decided a case regarding 
Netflix accessibility the same summer as the First Circuit district 
court decided Netflix II. In Cullen v. Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix I”), a hearing 
impaired individual brought a claim against Netflix alleging a Title 
III violation that was nearly identical to the claim brought before the 
First Circuit district court in Netflix II.162 The plaintiff in Netflix I 
alleged that Netflix’s limited selection of shows with closed 
captioning in its “Watch Instantly” service denied him equal access 
to the titles.163 The court acknowledged the decision in Netflix II 
earlier that summer, but stated that under Ninth Circuit law a 
website itself is not a place of public accommodation unless there is 
a nexus between the website and a physical place.164 Applying this 
rule, the court held that Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” website was not 
subject to Title III and dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA claim.165 
These district court decisions, along with the Netflix II court’s 
decision, have resulted in a clear split on the issue of whether the 
ADA applies to websites, albeit at the district court level only. 
Although the circuit split is not as clearly or deeply entrenched at the 
circuit court level, it is clear that a plaintiff may successfully bring a 
Title III claim against a website in one court, and completely fail in 
another. This discrepancy between the courts urges the need for a 
clear, consistent, and workable guideline that provides ADA 
protection in an intuitive way while staying within the bounds of the 
text of the ADA. 
 
 160. No. CV–10–133–M–DWM–JCL., 2011 WL 1883190 (D. Mont. May 17, 2011). 
 161. Id. at *1 (quoting Weyer v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp.,198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
 162. 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see supra, Part III.A.2. 
 163. Netflix I, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–22. 
 164. Id. at 1023. 
 165. Id. at 1024. 
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C. Reconciling the Circuit Split 
Several commentators and court opinions have discussed the 
split between the circuits on the issue of whether Title III applies to  
 
 
websites.166 I believe, however, that the split between the courts is 
reconcilable at the circuit court level. 
In Netflix II, The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts held that a website—as a standalone entity167—is a 
place of public accommodation while citing to First Circuit precedent 
in Carparts.168 However, it is not certain that the First Circuit would 
have upheld the district court’s judgment on appeal if the case had 
not settled. Although the language in Carparts plainly states that a 
place of public accommodation is not limited to actual physical 
structures, the actual analysis in the case focuses on access of 
services or goods offered from a physical place through nonphysical 
mediums like phone or mail.169 It is possible that instead of standing 
for the proposition that a place of public accommodation can be a 
virtual place, the decision of the court in Carparts may have simply 
lacked focus in its holding.170 The First Circuit’s decision may more 
precisely stand for the proposition that Title III requires access to 
goods and services of a place of public accommodation. 
The decisions in Doe and Pallozzi focus on nonphysical access of a 
good or service rather than the physical or nonphysical nature of the 
place of public accommodation offering the good or service. Even the 
language in Doe about websites falling under Title III does not state 
that a website itself is a place of public accommodation, rather, the 
 
 166. See, e.g., Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 
2004); Anderson, supra note 129, at 170–81; Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 9, at 280; Michael O. 
Finnigan Jr., Brian C. Griffith & Heather M. Lutz, Accommodating Cyberspace: Application of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act to the Internet, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1795, 1812 (2007). 
 167. See supra note 95. 
 168. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200–02 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 169. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Congress clearly contemplated that ‘service establishments’ 
include providers of services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical 
structure.”). 
 170. This lack of focus would be understandable because, even though the World Wide 
Web was somewhat developed by 1994, it is unlikely that the First Circuit contemplated a 
nonphysical entity (such as a website) offering access to a good (such as a movie) through 
nonphysical means. 
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court’s statement that “[t]he core meaning of this provision . . . is 
that the owner or operator of a . . . Web site . . . cannot exclude 
persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility 
in the same way the nondisabled do,”171 refers to a website as a 
means of access to a facility. Pallozzi also limited its holding of Title 
III regulation to “the sale of insurance policies in insurance offices,” 
stating that Title III does not merely regulate access to the office 
itself, but the goods and services inside the office, no matter how 
they are accessed.172 This language does not clearly lead to the 
proposition that a service offered in a nonphysical place—i.e., 
cyberspace—is a place of public accommodation. In light of Doe and 
Pallozzi’s more focused decisions, it is possible that the First Circuit 
might clarify and narrow the scope of its decision in Carparts to focus 
on access of a physical place through a nonphysical medium if given 
the opportunity.173 
The Second and Seventh Circuits’ focus on Title III’s application 
to nonphysical access of a physical place is nearly identical to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Title III forbids “intangible barriers” 
to physical places.174 Doe and Pallozzi involved plaintiffs who were 
allegedly denied equal enjoyment of insurance plans offered by an 
insurance office through policies, which had the disparate impact of 
discriminating against individuals with certain disabilities.175 
Likewise, Rendon involved plaintiffs who were allegedly denied equal 
access to an opportunity to be on a game show through procedures 
that had the disparate impact of screening out individuals with 
certain disabilities. In these three cases the three courts held that 
such procedures violated Title III. 
The split becomes more reconcilable upon observation that the 
Sixth, Third, and Ninth Circuits’ holdings in Parker, Ford, and Weyer 
(respectively) were based on the reasoning that the insurance 
 
 171. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 172. Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
173.    In fact, a district court within the Seventh Circuit recently declined to answer the 
question of whether Title III applies to non-physical entities. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Ill. High 
Sch. Assoc., No. 12 C 3758, 2012 WL 3581174, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2012). The court did 
not even cite to Doe, instead citing to the Third Circuit Ford case and a district court case 
decided prior to Doe. Id. Perhaps district courts within the Seventh Circuit will continue to step 
away from the broad interpretation of Title III that is often attributed to the Seventh Circuit. 
 174. Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods. Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 175. See supra, Part III.A.1. 
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policies were not actually offered from the insurance office.176 
Although these circuits may have explicitly disagreed with decisions 
by circuits on the broad side of the split, the disagreement actually 
was about whether the policies were offered from the insurance 
office itself, rather than a difference in Title III interpretation. Thus, 
the holdings did not turn on a broad or narrow interpretation of Title 
III but on the application of Title III to the facts. The analysis in the 
decisions by the courts on both sides of the split actually appears 
very similar: First, they recognize that the insurance is a good or 
service. Next, they ask whether the policies of the insurance plan 
prevent access to a good offered at a place of public accommodation, 
which is essentially the nexus test. Finally, their decisions differ on 
whether the place the plans allegedly deny access to is a good or 
service of the insurance office itself or a product of an agreement 
that is not offered from the insurance office. 
In summary, the circuits involved in this split do not explicitly 
differ on the question of whether Title III applies to a nonphysical 
entity.177 The “narrow” circuits have explicitly held that Title III 
does not apply to a nonphysical entity while the “broad” circuits 
have not held otherwise. The circuit courts involved in this issue 
seem to agree that Title III prevents discrimination through 
intangible barriers to a physical place, whether onsite or offsite, and 
the only difference is that the “narrow” courts call this the nexus test 
while the “broad” circuits do not have a name for it. The circuit 
courts even employ similar analysis to determine whether the alleged 
discriminatory goods or services are covered under Title III.178 
Although the split between the circuits is reconcilable, a workable 
solution is needed, as this split has manifested itself in an 
irreconcilable way at the district court level. 
 
 176. See supra Part III.B. 
 177. It is also important to note that the First Circuit did not hold that the Wholesalers 
Association of New England and the health plan’s administrating trust was a place of public 
accommodation in Carparts. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass’n of New 
England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994); see also supra Part III.A.1. This means that Carparts 
is not in direct conflict with Stoutenborough, which held that an organization—i.e., the NFL and 
its club teams—was not a place of public accommodation. Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football 
League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1995). 
 178. Even the First Circuit, which stated that Title III is “not so limited” to actual physical 
structures, followed this pattern of analysis in Carparts, stating that Title III regulates goods and 
services offered through intangible means—over the phone for example—even if they do not 
deny actual physical access to a place. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20. 
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IV. THE STOREFRONT APPROACH: CONSTRUING THE ADA BROADLY 
WHILE STAYING WITHIN THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE 
The storefront test is a new solution, which has not been 
previously considered, to the problem of applying Title III protection 
to websites. The storefront test proposes the following: 
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a 
substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical facility 
may be subject to Title III if the facility and the website together 
form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the 
enumerated places of public accommodation. 
The storefront test builds upon the nexus test to extend Title III 
coverage to a variety of websites, including online-only retailers, 
while remaining true to the text of the statute. 
The first section of this Part establishes the textual boundaries of 
Title III and concludes that Title III does not cover websites as 
standalone entities179 but may cover websites operated by places of 
public accommodation. The second section of this Part explains the 
storefront test in depth and illustrates its utility as a workable 
standard for a wide variety of websites. 
A. The Plain Text of Title III Does Not Apply to Websites as Standalone 
Entities 
Any solution that applies Title III to websites must stay within 
the textual bounds of the ADA. In order to provide the maximum 
amount of Title III protection it is necessary to establish the 
boundaries of the text of the ADA. The plain text of Title III does not 
support a solution that applies Title III to nonphysical places, but the 
text is able to extend coverage to goods or services offered by a 
physical place through nonphysical means. 
It is well established that “the starting point for interpreting a 
statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly 
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”180 The plain text of Title III, as 
discussed in Part II.B, clearly does not list a website as a place of 
 
 179. See supra note 95. 
 180. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); see 
also United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
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public accommodation.181 Although Congress has stated its intent 
that the entities listed within the categories be illustrative and that 
liberal interpretation be given to the categories,182 none of the 
entities listed within the categories is sufficiently analogous to a 
virtual place to allow a website to fall under one of the “catchall’” 
terms at the end of the categories.183 It does not matter that a 
website offers the same goods or services as those listed in the 
categories; the website itself is an entirely different entity that is not 
covered under the plain language of Title III. Outside of the statute, 
the DOJ’s regulations do not contain any language that extends the 
ADA to cover nonphysical virtual places. The regulations define a 
place of public accommodation as a facility, and define a facility by 
listing characteristics that are clearly physical in nature.184 The 
courts and the DOJ are barred from creating a new category that 
might be analogous to virtual places because Congress has stated 
that the categories enumerated within Title III are exhaustive.185 
Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA does not indicate 
that Congress intended the ADA to apply to websites. Early drafts of 
Title III simply referred to “any public accommodation” rather than 
“place of public accommodation.”186 The term “place of public 
accommodation” was inserted into later drafts of the ADA, 
apparently—according to one of the original drafters of the ADA—
because Congress wanted the ADA’s coverage to be similar to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.187 This addition suggests that Congress 
intended to limit Title III to physical places. As the Third Circuit 
pointed out in Ford, the Civil Rights Act has clearly been limited to 
 
 181. See Finnigan, supra note 166, at 1826 (concluding that “the language of the ADA does 
not allow Title III to apply to the Internet”). 
 182. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 2, at 100 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 383; 
see also S. REP. NO. 101-16, at 59 (1989). 
 183. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2006). 
 184. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (“Facility means all or any portion of buildings, structures, 
sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, 
parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, 
structure, or equipment is located.”); see also supra Part II.B. 
 185. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 100; see also S. REP. NO. 101-16, at 59. 
 186. On the Threshold of Independence, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1988/Jan1988#9a2 (last visited Sept. 12, 2013) (emphasis 
added) (providing the first draft of the ADA as proposed by the National Council on Disability); 
see also H.R. 4498, 100th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2d Sess. 1988); 134 CONG. REC. 5110 (1988); 134 
CONG. REC. 1307 (1988). 
 187. See Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 9, at 285. 
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actual physical places and has been held not to cover such 
nonphysical entities as memberships in organizations.188 
General statements of legislative intent, such as the intent 
codified in section 12101(b) of the ADA, which states that the ADA 
is intended to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate 
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities,” 189 certainly lend support to an argument that Title III 
should apply to private websites as standalone entities. 
Unfortunately, these general statements fail to clearly indicate that 
Congress intended (or would intend) Title III to apply to websites. 
One indication of legislative intent may be found in Congress’s 
failure to amend Title III of the ADA to clearly apply to websites 
when Congress amended the ADA in 2008.190 As the question of 
whether Title III applies to private websites was well established by 
the time of the amendments, Congress’s silence on the issue may 
speak louder than any statements of general legislative intent that 
the ADA should be interpreted broadly.191 
As neither the plain text nor the legislative history indicate that a 
website is a place of public accommodation, a solution that applies 
the ADA to private websites would be inappropriate if it simply 
stated that any private website is subject to Title III. As the district 
court in Access Now stated, “[t]o expand the ADA to cover ‘virtual’ 
spaces would be to create new rights without well-defined 
standards.”192 
Despite Title III’s textual limitations, the ADA may still be used 
 
 188. Ford v. Schering Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 189. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 382 (explaining that Congress intends for the ADA to “bring individuals with disabilities 
into the economic and social mainstream of American life . . . in a clear, balanced, and 
reasonable manner”). 
 190. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §2, reprinted in 2008 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553; see also supra Part II.A. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44. Some commentators have suggested that if 
Congress were to regulate private website accessibility for individuals with disabilities, Congress 
might not even do it through Title III of the ADA. See Finnigan, supra note 166, at 1820-21; Kelly 
E. Konkright, An Analysis of the Applicability of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Private 
Internet Access Providers, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 713 (2001); see also supra Part II.A (noting that claims 
that a website violates the ADA are not brought under Title IV as the FCC has no authority to 
regulate the Internet). 
 192. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 
2002)). 
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to reach private websites. Title III clearly prohibits places of public 
accommodation from denying access to their facilities through 
intangible barriers. The statute prohibits eligibility criteria; policies, 
practices, or procedures; and communication barriers that prevent 
access to a facility’s goods or services.193 Websites operated by 
places of public accommodation may fall under any one of such 
barriers—especially “communication barriers”—that prevent access 
to a facility’s goods or services; it appears that every circuit court 
that has addressed this issue would agree that a website can be a 
barrier within the meaning of Title III.194 Therefore, Title III may be 
used by courts to regulate certain websites without falling outside of 
the bounds of the ADA. 
The nexus test is likely the best way to reach private websites 
through the ADA, after some modifications. Although some courts 
have limited the scope of the nexus test—to wit, Target—the nexus 
test can be modified in a way that provides Title III protection to 
individuals with disabilities and reaches online-only retail 
establishments through the “storefront” test. 
B. The Storefront Test: A Broader Version of the Nexus Test, Which Protects 
Individuals with Disabilities While Conforming to the Text of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act 
The storefront test builds upon the nexus test, which has been 
criticized for being overly narrow,195 and expands on the nexus test 
to include any website that serves as an access point to goods or 
services of an enumerated place of public accommodation. The 
storefront test (or rule) is as follows: 
Any website that acts as a storefront for an entity that offers a 
substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical facility 
may be subject to Title III if the facility and the website together 
form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the 
enumerated places of public accommodation. 
 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(i)–(iv) (2006). 
 194. E.g., Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods. Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Title 
III covers both tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers . . . and intangible 
barriers, such as eligibility requirements and screening rules or discriminatory policies and 
procedures that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services 
and privileges.”); see also supra Part III. 
 195. See Abrar, supra note 97, at 184. 
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This approach will enable courts to reach online-only retail 
establishments without overstepping the boundaries of the text of 
the ADA. 
The nexus test distinguishes between websites that provide access 
to a place of public accommodation from websites that are 
standalone entities. A website that is a standalone entity, offering 
goods and services through a nonphysical virtual place, is not subject 
to Title III. A website that merely provides access to a good or 
service of a physical facility may be covered under Title III. Using the 
Target court’s narrow application of the nexus test, the nexus test 
applies to websites operated by sales and rental establishments that 
have physical facilities open to the public, such as Wal-Mart, 
Blockbuster, Best Buy, or even smaller specialized retail stores such 
as the Apple Retail Store. However, under Target, coverage of the 
ADA only extends to goods or services on the website that are 
offered in the retail stores themselves, precluding online-only 
products, specials, and offers.196 The nexus test likewise extends to 
any other entity listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), such as a hotel, 
movie theater, or insurance office, as long as the products and prices 
offered online are the same as those offered inside the facilities 
themselves. So while the nexus test does extend Title III to some 
websites, plaintiffs will not be able to state a Title III claim if the 
good or service they are attempting to access is not actually offered 
in a physical facility that is open to the public. 
The storefront test expands on the nexus test by extending Title 
III to any website that acts as a mere storefront to an entity that 
offers a substantial amount of its goods or services from a physical 
facility, if together the website and the facility would fall under one 
of the enumerated places of public accommodation. Under the 
storefront test it does not matter whether the facility is open to the 
public. If the website provides access to goods or services offered 
from a physical facility, such as a warehouse, then the website acts 
as a storefront to the warehouse and together they are considered a 
sales facility. The storefront approach considers the website as an 
extension of the physical facility. If the goods and services are offered 
from a physical facility and the website is merely a means of 
accessing the goods or services of that facility, and if considered 
together the website and the facility form an entity that is 
 
 196. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), the website will be subject to 
Title III. It is necessary, however, that the goods or services must be 
offered from the physical facility, and not solely from the website, 
such as a software download or a social networking service that 
takes place exclusively over the Internet. The storefront test would 
also extend to goods or services that are online-only offers of an 
establishment that is open to the public, such as Target, because the 
goods or services are still offered from a physical facility via the 
website. 
To illustrate the storefront test, consider Amazon, an online-only 
retailer that does not offer products to the public from a physical 
facility except through its website. Amazon has warehouses and 
distribution centers located throughout the world.197 When a 
customer orders a product from Amazon.com, the product, which is 
located inside one of Amazon’s warehouses or distribution centers, 
is pulled from the shelf and shipped to the customer.198 Amazon’s 
website is merely a means of accessing the goods offered from the 
warehouses, a tool that allows customers to browse the “aisles,” put 
items into their “shopping carts,” and pay for the goods. This is 
essentially the same thing a customer does when patronizing Wal-
Mart—the goods come from a distribution center, are stored 
somewhere within the store, stocked on the shelves, and the 
customers browse around, place items in their shopping carts, and 
pay for the items at a checkout lane—except Amazon’s customer 
does not physically enter a facility to shop. Under the storefront test, 
if goods or services are offered from a physical facility—that is, if you 
were to visit one of the facilities for which the website serves as a 
storefront and find the goods or services that are offered online 
there—then the facility is the place where the online goods or 
services are offered to the public and the website merely serves as 
the means by which customers access the products offered from that 
place. Thus, under the storefront test, Amazon and other online-only 
sales establishments that offer their products from a physical facility 
 
 197. Global Locations, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/b/?node=239366011 (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 198. Spencer Soper, Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, MORNING CALL (Sept. 18, 2011), 
http://articles.mcall.com/2011-09-18/news/mc-allentown-amazon-complaints-
20110917_1_warehouse-workers-heat-stress-brutal-heat; Matt Stopera, What it Looks Like Inside 
Amazon.com, BUZZFEED (NOV. 28, 2011), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mjs538/what-it-looks-like-
inside-amazoncom. 
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would be subject to Title III. 
The storefront test borrows language from Young v. Facebook, 
where the same Ninth Circuit district court, which narrowly applied 
the nexus test in Target, found that Facebook.com was not subject to 
Title III because, “Facebook only operates in cyberspace” and “[w]hile 
Facebook’s physical headquarters obviously is a physical space, it is 
not a place where the online services to which [the plaintiff] claims she was 
denied access are offered to the public.”199 Under the storefront test, 
Facebook.com would not be subject to Title III because Facebook’s 
online social networking services take place in cyberspace. A visitor 
of Facebook’s facilities might find web designers and programmers, 
and may even find the servers from which Facebook operates, but it 
will be impossible for a visitor to see or interact with his or her 
social network simply by visiting the facility (unless, of course, the 
visitor is on a computer or smartphone). Thus, while Facebook may 
be developed from a physical place, its services are offered 
exclusively from its website. This distinguishes Facebook from 
Amazon, which offers the goods from a warehouse that the website 
provides access to. Thus, while Amazon’s website is merely the way 
that customers access the goods and services that are offered from a 
physical facility—a storefront—Facebook’s website is the location 
where services are offered. 
To be successful in a Title III claim under the storefront test, a 
plaintiff alleging a Title III violation by a website will have to make 
the same showings he or she would have to show under a typical 
Title III claim.200 The biggest difference under the storefront test is 
that a covered entity, such as a sales or rental establishment, would 
be subject to Title III whether it has a physical storefront or a virtual 
storefront that is open to the public. Under Title III, covered entities 
would not be required to make accommodations to their websites if 
they are not readily achievable, would result in undue burden, or 
 
 199. Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal 2011) (emphasis 
added); see also Ouellette v. Viacom, No. CV–10–133–M–DWM–JCL, 2011 WL 1883190, at *1 
(D. Mont. May 17, 2011) (“[N]either a website nor its servers are actual, physical places where 
goods or services are open to the public, putting them within the ambit of the ADA.” (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). 
 200. To be successful in a Title III claim the plaintiff must show: 1) the plaintiff has a 
disability and is subject to discrimination; 2) the accused party is a private entity that affects 
commerce; 3) the party owns, operates or leases a place of public accommodation as enumerated 
in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) and; 4) the plaintiff was denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods or 
services on the basis of a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006). 
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would fundamentally alter the nature of their goods or services.201 
Additionally, a facility that operates a website may be able to make 
alternative methods of accessing the goods available through the 
auxiliary aids such as a phone number where an individual can call  
 
 
to access the goods or services, or an alternate text-based website for 
individuals who use a screen reader.202 
As the storefront test is subject to the textual limitations of Title 
III, there would be several websites that offer goods or services 
online that would not be covered. Facebook is one example of such a 
website; another example would be a small company that offers 
computer software for download. Although the company may have a 
headquarters somewhere where the products are developed, the 
products are only offered from a virtual space. Thus, the website is 
not a mere storefront for the product, but is the whole store. 
Another important limitation would be a small online-only boutique 
that offers only a few homemade goods out of an individual’s home. 
The storefront approach determines what type of “place” the entity 
is by viewing the website as an extension of the facility that offers 
the goods or services. Whereas a warehouse that offers a variety of 
goods to the public through a website (acting as the storefront to the 
warehouse) would be a “sales establishment” under Title III,203 an 
individual that offers a limited selection of goods out of their home 
through a website would not qualify as a sales establishment. While 
the website might serve as a means of accessing the goods, the 
individual offering the goods out of his or her home would not be 
subject to Title III any more than individuals selling homemade 
goods to the public directly out of their home (not through a 
website) or offering piano lessons from their home. These 
limitations assure that the storefront test is in compliance with the 
text of the ADA and prevents the storefront test from becoming 
over-inclusive and burdensome. 
The requirement that a facility operating a website must offer a 
substantial amount of its goods or services from the physical facility is 
an important element of the storefront test. This serves both limiting 
 
 201. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(i)–(iv). 
 202. See id. 12182(b)(2)(iii), (v); Anderson, supra note 129, at 183. 
 203. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). 
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and expansive functions. It limits Title III from reaching an online-
only entity, such as Facebook, that may also sell T-shirts online. 
Even if Facebook’s T-shirts sold well, no one would consider 
Facebook a T-shirt company. Therefore, a substantial portion of 
Facebook’s goods or services are only offered from a virtual location. 
This would place Facebook outside of the reach of Title III even if 
Facebook offered a few goods from a physical location. On the other 
hand, Amazon offers books for digital download from its virtual 
website. While such a good, standing alone, would not be subject to 
Title III under the storefront test, Amazon offers a substantial 
amount of its goods from a physical facility. Because Amazon offers a 
substantial amount of its goods from a physical location, its digital 
goods would also be subject to Title III. 
The analysis of the “substantial amount of goods or services” 
element of the storefront test would be more nuanced if it were 
determined that Amazon devotes a significant portion of its business 
operations to digital book sales, or that customers make as much use 
of the digital goods as the physical goods. Netflix is a great example 
of such a business. Netflix offers both a “Watch Instantly” service 
and a mail order DVD service from the same website. It would be 
difficult to decide which of Netflix’s services is more “substantial,” 
as both services are so widely used that Netflix had at one-time 
considered splitting the two services into separate businesses.204 
Netflix’s mail order DVD service would clearly fall under Title III 
based on the storefront test, as the goods and services are offered 
through a physical rental establishment via the Internet; Netflix’s 
“Watch Instantly” service, however, would not be covered by Title III 
under the storefront test, as its services are offered exclusively 
through a virtual, nonphysical website. Under the storefront test, 
Netflix’s website would be regulated similarly to wholesale 
establishments that make goods available to the public. 
The wholesale establishment exception was promulgated by the 
DOJ to preclude wholesale establishments that sell goods exclusively 
to other business from Title III coverage.205 If the wholesale 
 
 204. Brad Tuttle, Qwikster Split: The Real Reason Netflix Broke in Two, TIME BUS. & MONEY 
(Sept. 20, 2011), http://business.time.com/2011/09/20/qwikster-split-the-real-reason-netflix-
broke-in-two; see also Stu Woo, Under Fire, Netflix Rewinds DVD Plan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 
2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203499704576622674082410578.html. 
 205. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. C at 206. 
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establishment decides to make some goods available to the public, 
then only the portion of the wholesale establishment that is made 
open to the public would be subject to Title III.206 Similar to the 
wholesale establishment exception, Netflix’s streaming service  
 
would not be subject to Title III while Netflix’s online mail order 
service would be covered by Title III.207 
Although there will be some websites that will be outside of the 
reach of the ADA under the storefront test, this limitation is 
necessitated by the plain text of the statute. The storefront test 
pushes the ADA to its textual limits, providing Title III protection to 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Cf. Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011–12 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(analogizing the wholesale establishment exception and carve-out provision to an insurance plan 
offered solely through a business’s employee health insurance program and an insurance plan 
offered to the public). 
An interesting question arises when considering how the storefront test would apply to the 
service that Amazon offers between vendors and individuals putting up items for sale on 
Amazon, and how Amazon, the vendors, and the individuals would be dealt with under the 
storefront test. Note that this service is offered on the same website that Amazon uses for its 
own sale of goods. First, a determination would be made about whether Amazon’s service 
between vendors constitutes a substantial amount of Amazon’s overall goods or services. If this 
service was only minor, as in the example of Facebook’s T-shirts, then Amazon’s service 
between vendors would be subject to the ADA to the extent that Amazon as a whole would be 
subject to the ADA under the storefront test. But if Amazon’s service between vendors was 
determined to be substantial, as I believe it would be, then Amazon’s service between vendors 
and individual sellers would be analyzed separately from Amazon’s own retail services. This 
service, which connects vendors and individual sellers to buyers, is offered entirely through 
cyberspace, with no actual connection to a physical location. Thus, Amazon’s exchange service 
would not be subject to the ADA under the storefront test. A district court located in the 
Eleventh Circuit actually addressed the question of whether an online timeshare exchange 
network was subject to the ADA and found that the exchange network was not subject to the 
ADA because “[p]laintiff has sued an entity that is service-based, rather than property-based, 
and exists in ‘cyberspace,’ but is not ‘a place of public accommodation.’” Steelman v. Florida, 
No. 6:13–cv–123–Orl–36DAB, 2013 WL 1104746, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2013). As for the 
individuals selling goods through Amazon’s exchange service, the individuals would not be 
subject to the ADA as noted supra text accompanying notes 198–200. Whether vendors would be 
subject to the ADA under the storefront test is a much more interesting question. If a vendor 
selling items through Amazon’s exchange service is an actual retail establishment with a 
physical location where they either sell goods to the public from that location or store and ship 
out goods to customers through online sales, it would appear that Amazon’s exchange service is 
the storefront for that vendor. The storefront test requires, however, that “the facility and the 
website together form an entity that would otherwise fall under one of the enumerated places of 
public accommodation.” The vendor and Amazon’s exchange service, together, do not form an 
entity that would subject the vendor to the ADA under the storefront test any more than a 
vendor at a flea market would be responsible for the hosting facility’s ADA compliance. 
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many more websites than the current nexus test (as applied by the 
Target court) while staying within the bounds of the statute. The 
storefront test also reconciles the split between the circuits without 
favoring one circuit’s decisions over the others’. While the storefront 
test is not a substitute for legislation, it would allow the courts to 
ensure that individuals with disabilities are provided with equal 
access to websites that offer goods or services from a physical facility 
while adhering to judicial principles of prudence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined the problem presented by websites 
that are inaccessible to individuals with disabilities and offered a 
new solution that would place many websites within the ambit of 
the ADA. A circuit split has clearly manifested itself at the district 
court level on the issue of whether Title III of the ADA covers 
websites. Although the plain text of Title III does not provide 
protection for individuals against discrimination by private websites, 
the storefront test would enable courts to extend Title III protection 
to websites while staying within the bounds of the text of the 
statute. The storefront test builds upon the narrow nexus test by 
considering the function of the website together with the nature of 
the physical facility offering the goods, expanding Title III coverage 
to online-only retailers, among other websites. Although there are 
websites that would still be outside the reach of Title III, a judicial 
rule cannot fully regulate the new and vast frontier of the World 
Wide Web. New legislation is needed. In the meantime, the 
storefront test is a practical and workable solution that logically 
extends Title III coverage to websites without overstepping judicial 
bounds. 
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